Transformation of the Conflict Field in Abkhazia: Contemporary Politics and Historical Context, by Sergey Markedonov
WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2024, vol. 68, no. 12, pp. 111-121
WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2024, vol. 68, no. 12, pp. 111-121
Originally published in Russian [Трансформация конфликтного поля в Абхазии: современная политика и исторический контекст], this article has been translated into English by AbkhazWorld. The full article in PDF can be downloaded by clicking here.
TRANSFORMATION OF THE CONFLICT FIELD IN ABKHAZIA: CONTEMPORARY POLITICS AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Sergey M. MARKEDONOV, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Institute for International Studies, MGIMO University, 76, Prospekt Vernadskogo, Moscow, 119454, Russian Federation.
Abstract. This article proposes a new approach to examining the genesis and dynamics of conflicts in Abkhazia. In accordance with the theoretical constructs of P. Bourdieu, the author explores the Abkhaz case as a conflict field. This is presented as an interplay of interaction, competition, and confrontation among various actors from the mid-19th to the first quarter of the 21st century. In the author’s view, the conflict field in Abkhazia is not synonymous with the Georgian-Abkhaz confrontation during the Soviet collapse, the disintegration of the Russian Empire, or the confrontation between the Russian Federation and the West for dominance in the South Caucasus. The author identifies several turning points in the formation of the Abkhaz conflict field. These are linked to the radical reconfiguration of the regional order, shifts in the ethno-demographic balance, national self-determination, and the competition between different state projects for dominance over Abkhaz territory. The article traces the interconnections between the changing regional order in the Caucasus in the mid- to late 19th century, the Georgian-Abkhaz ethnopolitical conflict, and the development of Abkhazia as a partially recognised entity under Russian military and political patronage.
Keywords: conflict field, Abkhazia, Russia, Georgia, nationalism, secession, Muhajirism, identity, South Caucasus, self-determination.
CAUCASIAN TURBULENCE AND ABKHAZ CONFLICT DYNAMICS
In the final years of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus became one of the most turbulent and insecure regions in Eurasia. The majority of conflicts that accompanied the collapse of the once-unified state occurred precisely in the Caucasus region [1]. It was also here that a record number of de facto entities emerged (until 2014, more than half of the total number of post-Soviet republics with “problematic” sovereignty). The ethnopolitical dynamics in the Caucasus largely became a model for other regions of the former USSR. Conflicts in various parts of the South Caucasus vividly demonstrated that the division of the “Soviet heritage” based on the principle of uti possidetis juris—that is, demarcation strictly in accordance with the borders of the union republics—is difficult to implement in practice. It was in the Caucasus region that a precedent was set for the international legitimisation of former Soviet autonomous entities [2]. However, another precedent was later established here—the elimination of a secessionist (irredentist) project and the successful restoration of a state’s territorial integrity [3].
The turbulence of the South Caucasus has contributed to the active involvement of external actors in regional processes [4]. The internationalisation of the conflicts here was not limited to a local remake of the Cold War in the form of a confrontation between Russia and the West. Turkey, Iran, China, India, and other actors also articulated their interests in the Caucasus, which did not always and in every respect coincide with the approaches of Moscow, Washington, and Brussels [5]. And although the Caucasus region was overshadowed by Ukraine with the outbreak of armed conflict in Donbas in 2014, the events of 2020-2023 in Nagorno-Karabakh once again raised its international significance. Today, we are witnessing the formation of a new regional status quo, where some familiar alliances (Russia-Armenia, NATO-Georgia) are experiencing crises, while others (Turkey-Azerbaijan), on the contrary, are significantly strengthening [5].
Against this backdrop, the situation in and around Abkhazia appears, at first glance, static. After Russia recognised its independence on 26 August 2008, and the republic’s elites and population received reliable security guarantees and prospects for economic recovery from Moscow, the Russian Federation’s influence here has strengthened considerably. Official Tbilisi has abandoned the practical implementation of revanchist ideas, that is, the “restoration of territorial integrity” through military operations. The West, although not recognising the “new normality”, has, in effect, acquiesced to Abkhazia’s “special status”. The Euro-Atlantic integration of Georgia was de facto frozen, long before the start of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine. Thus, the military-political balance of power that emerged in this part of the Caucasus in 2008 has become thoroughly “cemented”.
However, it would be incorrect to equate today’s Abkhaz stability with a full-fledged peaceful settlement. Firstly, Georgia does not consider the issue of Abkhazia’s status to be definitively resolved against its favour. Secondly, Tbilisi’s claims are still supported by the overwhelming majority of UN member states (including not only countries defined by the Russian authorities as unfriendly, but also important partners of Moscow such as China, India, and Iran). Thirdly, the diversification of Georgia’s foreign policy and Tbilisi’s refusal to “open a second front” against Moscow amidst the escalating confrontation between Russia and the West leave certain opportunities for Georgian-Russian normalisation. This is especially so given that Moscow, after several years of a near-complete “freeze” in bilateral relations, decided to abolish visas for Georgian citizens, resume direct flights, and remove Georgia from the list of countries not recommended for travel.
Evidently, if the Georgian-Russian “détente” gains momentum, the question of determining Abkhazia’s status will inevitably become a priority topic in the dialogue between Moscow and Tbilisi, and in the future, it cannot be ruled out that it will also feature in discussions between Russia and the West. Consequently, the issue of a possible geopolitical “deal” between the Russian Federation and Georgia at Abkhazia’s expense, aimed at strengthening Moscow’s position in the South Caucasus, could be revived.
However, conflict resolution in Abkhazia cannot be reduced to the format of Russian-Georgian relations, nor to “grand geopolitics”. Within Abkhaz society and its political establishment, we are observing a serious reprioritisation. The focus of public debate is not the struggle for self-determination from Georgia, but the “price” of building an asymmetric strategic alliance between the Russian Federation and Abkhazia. The key issues are Russian access to Abkhaz resources, the formulation and adoption of political and administrative decisions on matters of mutual interest, and the equality of the allies. Within this discussion, historical subjects are also being reinterpreted (the incorporation of Abkhazia into the Russian state, the Lykhny Uprising of 1866, Muhajirism). The interest in them is dictated less by academic reasons and more by socio-political ones. Today’s ethno-demographic problems are interpreted primarily as the long-term negative consequences of the Caucasian War and the many years of Russian-Turkish confrontation in the region [6].
Today, within the Abkhaz establishment (both in power and in opposition) and society, there is no competition between “geopolitical projects”, and the pro-Russian choice unites even the fiercest opponents, such as President A.G. Bzhaniya and his predecessor R.D. Khajimba. However, complex collisions do exist in the relations between Russia and Abkhazia. They manifest themselves primarily in the search for and determination of optimal models for the republic’s post-conflict development and concern a wide range of issues, from dual citizenship to Russian access to Abkhaz land ownership [7].
In this context, a new explanatory model of conflict dynamics in Abkhazia is urgently needed—one that extends beyond the chronological framework of the late Soviet period and the first post-Soviet years to cover the period from the mid-19th century to the present day. The large-scale socio-political transformations in the late USSR sharpened discussions about the national-state self-determination of the Georgian SSR and intensified contradictions between the leadership of Georgia and Abkhazia, and between the union centre and Tbilisi. The collapse of the unified state effectively left the Georgian and Abkhaz sides face-to-face, without a moderator in the form of a central government that had for many years maintained a fragile status quo in the region.
Meanwhile, all the main issues on the conflict agenda (language and settlement policy, ethnic representation in government, the legal status of the autonomous entity within the union republic) were formulated long before Gorbachev’s perestroika, as evidenced by the regular gatherings, protest actions, and petition campaigns that took place in the 1930s-1970s in Sukhum, Tbilisi, and other settlements of the Abkhazian ASSR and the Georgian SSR [8]. But even these contradictions did not ripen overnight. Discourses of “one’s own” ideal Abkhazia (radically opposite in content) were being formed as early as the beginning of the last century. The revolutionary upheavals across the Russian Empire, followed by its collapse, facilitated the transition of latent conflicts into open armed confrontations for ethno-national self-determination.
Yet even the aforementioned discourses did not form in a vacuum. They were significantly influenced by the end of the Russo-Ottoman rivalry for the Caucasus and the integration of the Abkhazian Principality into the Russian state. It was then, from the mid-19th to the early 20th century, that the ethnic composition of Abkhazia underwent significant changes [9]. With the collapse of the Russian Empire, which, like the USSR later, had acted as an arbiter in inter-ethnic disputes, the existing contradictions erupted into open conflict. Only the “Sovietisation” of the South Caucasus led to a new “general demarcation” in the region, which ensured a political-legal and military-political status quo for nearly seven decades. However, even this balance of power was far from satisfactory for everyone. With the weakening and subsequent disintegration of the union state, latent problems and contradictions came to the surface.
Thus, we consider it necessary to trace the relationship between the geopolitical reconfiguration of the Caucasus in the second half of the 19th century, the various phases of the Georgian-Abkhaz ethnopolitical conflict during the periods of imperial and Soviet collapse, and the modern stage of Abkhazia’s national-state self-determination under Russian patronage. The main research question of our article can be formulated as follows: how and why did various interstate and inter-ethnic confrontations on the territory of modern Abkhazia—differing in nature, origin, intensity, and composition of participants—form a common conflict field? Answering this question would allow for a better understanding of the unique situation in Abkhazia in comparison with other conflicts in the South Caucasus.
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