The War in Abkhazia, 1992–1993: A Critical Response to G. Zhorzholiani’s “Reliable Facts”, by Aslan Avidzba

Abkhazovedenie. Istoriya, arkheologiya, etnologiya, Issue 2, Sukhum, 2003, pp. 82–100. The article was written in June 2001. Translated by AbkhazWorld

Aslan Avidzba
Historian and Doctor of Historical Sciences (2016). His research focuses on the modern history of Abkhazia.

Published in: Abkhazovedenie. Istoriya, arkheologiya, etnologiya, Issue 2, Sukhum, 2003, pp. 82–100. The article was written in June 2001.

In this article by Aslan Avidzba, which we have translated, we once again come across the absurd notion — one we have frequently discussed here and elsewhere — that “the Abkhaz are/were a Georgian tribe,” a belief still held by more than half of the Georgian population. It must be understood, once again, that the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict cannot be resolved as long as this endless Georgian ignorance persists. Unfortunately, this ignorance is not limited to ordinary Georgian citizens but extends to the Georgian academic community, political circles and more... The solution lies not in our repeated efforts to tell the truth, but in their willingness to learn it. Sadly, there seems to be no limit to Georgian chauvinism and ignorance.

— AW.

Priest in Abkhaz » аҧшьаҩы’

See also: Exposing Ignorance: Navigating the Sea of Deceptions

Countries and peoples between whom wars have taken place cannot for a long time overcome their mutual phobias and prejudices. Despite the saying that “all wars end in peace”, Abkhazia is still far from that point. Nearly eight years have passed since the end of large-scale military operations, yet it is impossible to speak of peace. Abkhazia has become one of the central arenas in which contradictions have clashed, leading to the formation of a geopolitical collapse in the Caucasus — a region that, for centuries, has remained one of the “powder kegs” threatening the stability of Europe and the wider world.

The formation of a multipolar world has resulted in the West being represented in the region by several independent actors. It is therefore quite possible that, in the near future, “the policy of the West towards the Abkhaz–Georgian confrontation will consist of the pursuit by its various representatives of their own interests.” For the moment, however, despite occasional minor inconsistencies in action, the West as a whole demonstrates a balanced approach to this problem.

The introduction, at the suggestion of the West, of the geographical term (with political overtones) “South Caucasus” into the political lexicon of the world’s elites serves as an eloquent indicator of the direction of its geopolitical interests. The term implies a division of the Caucasus into South and North; in this scheme, the “South Caucasus” is viewed as an unquestioned sphere of influence of the United States and the West, while the North is, for the time being, left to Russia — albeit with certain reservations regarding the question of Chechnya. The policies of the world’s influential elites are pursued without consideration for the interests of the peoples inhabiting the region.

The geopolitical games being played around Abkhazia, which have brought it to exhaustion, bode ill for both Abkhazia and Georgia alike. One might think that this should have encouraged both sides to seek to minimise the impact of external factors and to resolve their disagreements independently. As Erich Fromm once wisely remarked:

“So long as we do not dare to ‘acknowledge our own national guilt’, people will remain prisoners of stereotyped thinking, condemning the crimes of their enemies while being completely blind to the crimes of their own nation.” ¹

In Georgia today, the syndrome of the “aggressive separatism” of the Abkhazians — portrayed as enemies of the Georgian nation — has not yet been overcome. An important contribution to the reinforcement of this stereotype has been made by the works of many Georgian servants of the goddess Clio, who in the post-war period have revived pseudo-scientific theories about the history and culture of Abkhazia. A volume of essays entitled Razyskaniya po istorii Abkhazii /Gruziya (Research on the History of Abkhazia / Georgia) provides confirmation of this. ²

The newspaper Svobodnaya Gruziya (Free Georgia) published a review of that collection. ³ In it, the collection as a whole — and in particular an article by one of its editors, G. Zhorzholiani (a former employee of Communist-Party structures in Abkhazia and Georgia and a newly-minted “historian”) — received high praise. However, contrary to the reviewer’s claims, neither the collection as a whole nor G. Zhorzholiani’s article warrants such laudatory assessments.

As a contemporary of the events described, the author is forced to act as an objectified subject — a fact that complicates the researcher’s task but does not absolve him of the duty to approach the issues discussed impartially. In this, the author fails — indeed, it appears he never sought to succeed.

First and foremost, it should be noted that G. Zhorzholiani, in a manner wholly inappropriate for an author claiming objectivity, accuses the Abkhazians of “ultranationalism”, “separatism”, “extremism”, and so forth — and, what is even more inadmissible for a scholar, speaks in the name of the state structures of Georgia.

Already the very title of his scholarly article, “Istoricheskiye i politicheskiye korni konflikta v Abkhazii /Gruziya” (The Historical and Political Roots of the Conflict in Abkhazia / Georgia), reveals an inflation of the official political lexicon of Georgia’s ruling circles.

Firstly, the events of 1992–1993 in Abkhazia are called a “conflict”, whereas they should be qualified as a “war” — for it is precisely this term that conveys the essence of the events that took place in Abkhazia after 14 August 1992, that is, after the entry of the troops of the State Council of Georgia.

Secondly, the names Abkhazia and Georgia are written separated by a slash (“/”), which, according to its propagators, symbolises that Abkhazia is an inseparable part of Georgia — a claim that Zhorzholiani’s publication is designed to prove.

Throughout his article the author wages a campaign against the “myths” of “Abkhazia’s two-thousand-year-old statehood”, the “assimilationist policy of Georgia”, the “demographic expansion of the Georgians”, and the “oppression of the Abkhazians”. ⁴ Many of Zhorzholiani’s theses are a purely subjectivist reflection of his political views and therefore cannot serve as a basis for scholarly debate.

“In general, it must be said that he (G. Zhorzholiani — A.A.) at one moment calls upon the Abkhazians to friendship and brotherhood with the Georgians (pp. 438–439), then speaks of peace being enforced by non-military means (p. 437); following Ingorokva, he repeats the thesis of the Abkhazians’ late-mediaeval migration (p. 414), yet suddenly himself emphasises that the Abkhazians ‘have had and have no other homeland’ (p. 438). The key factor in restoring trust between the two peoples he considers to be ‘the raising of the national self-consciousness of the Abkhaz people’ (p. 439), without realising that he thereby offends the Abkhaz nation.” ⁵

Given the chronological framework of the present work, there is no need to dwell in greater detail on this stage of Zhorzholiani’s “creativity”. It will therefore focus instead on how some of the author’s so-called “reliable facts” from The Historical and Political Roots of the Conflict in Abkhazia / Georgia correspond to facts without quotation marks. G. Zhorzholiani asserts that, despite the complications in Georgian–Abkhaz relations, “the leadership of Georgia repeatedly acted as an initiator of the peaceful settlement of the conflict and called for dialogue.”⁶

However, G. Nodia cites the following words of Z. Gamsakhurdia, spoken at one of his rallies:

“The Abkhaz demands for self-determination are just, but they have erred in their territory. They should be allowed to return to the North Caucasus, and we will support their struggle there.”⁷

Zhorzholiani, driven not by objective factors but by subjective interests and situational traditions, describes “the ultranationalist statements of the former president of the Republic of Georgia and his supporters (‘Apsua — the modern Abkhazians — are newcomers from the North Caucasus’, ‘there exists no Abkhaz nation’, etc.)” as *“though reactive, yet by no means justified.”*⁸

At the same time, he does not label as “unjustified” the statement by Chabua Amirejibi:

“The Abkhazians are a Georgian tribe.”⁹

Georgia experienced an outburst of ethnonationalism accompanied by waves of anti-Abkhaz sentiment. The leitmotif of these statements can be summarised in the following excerpts:

“The tribes that came as guests appropriated the name of the most ancient Georgian tribe — the Abkhazians — and, emboldened by our naïveté, even imposed the Adyghe language upon the Georgian tribe of the Abkhazians. Now the newcomer from beyond the mountains, entwining our national body like ivy, disputes our land... The time has come for vigorous and decisive action.”¹⁰

“The land upon which the Abkhaz lives so freely is Georgian land, and the Georgian people will not yield it to anyone.”¹¹

In my view, a particularly striking example is an issue of the journal Kritika (Critique). The organ of the Writers’ Union of Georgia, addressing the Abkhaz people, published the following words on its title page:

“Do not compel us to the point where one day we too shall take up arms; and if there is no justice for us, we shall take weapons and show the guest the road back to where he descended from the mountains a couple of centuries ago.”¹²

The futility of such theses about “guests”, “newcomers”, and “mountain folk” makes it pointless to engage them in polemics. It suffices to note that the Abkhazians’ aspiration to preserve their own identity threatened no one — least of all the Writers’ Union of Georgia. Serving the interests of ethnonationalism was also the Georgian Church, which had become one of the pulpits of radical nationalism. The Catholicos of Georgia’s call that “a Georgian must not shoot a Georgian”, interpreted by his obedient flock as a licence to shoot non-Georgians, eloquently testified to the orientation of the Georgian Church’s activities at that time.

In this connection, it is appropriate to recall the message of Patriarch of All Russia Alexy II to the faithful of Georgia, in which, addressing the Catholicos, he wrote:

“And even if we cannot, by our priestly word, stop the bloodshed, then by raising our voices against it, we shall at least avoid another sin — we shall not give the enemies of Orthodoxy cause to assert that our national churches are incapable of rising above nationalism.”¹³

Equally revealing was the statement of Metropolitan David of Tskhum–Abkhazia:

“Ardzinba has embarked upon a sinful path.”¹⁴

In December 1992, Eduard Shevardnadze underwent a pompous baptism ceremony — an act which, like everything associated with his name, was marked by a pragmatic calculation. After being christened with the meaningful name Giorgi, Shevardnadze obtained the “right” to lead not only his fellow citizens but also his co-religionists into the struggle for the “territorial integrity” of Georgia. After his baptism, Shevardnadze, it seems, put his faith not in God but in Georgia’s military might. To this period belong his statements, broadcast by all news agencies:

“They want war — they will get war,”

and

“Peace in Abkhazia can only be achieved by military means.”¹⁵

Shortly before that, Georgian Radio broadcast the declaration of T. Sigua:

“The Abkhaz conflict can only be resolved by military means.”¹⁶

Even today, Shevardnadze strives to live up to his new image:

“I am happy that in today’s Georgia more than 300 new churches have been built; many have been restored, and construction continues.”

He further stated:

“I confess that one of the main tasks of all my public service has been precisely the construction of the Trinity Cathedral.”¹⁷

Developing this theme, one may conclude that, due to the absence of democratic traditions,

“the state policy of Georgia, despite its accession to many conventions, is oriented towards the interests of the Orthodox Georgian part of the population. Discriminatory measures against citizens of certain nationalities on the part of the leadership evoke in the non-Georgian population feelings of alienation and mistrust towards state institutions.”¹⁸

D. Berdzenishvili wrote:

“Ten years ago, by supporting the patriarch of Georgian ethnonationalism, Gamsakhurdia, the Georgians chose the road to nowhere.”¹⁹

Yet, despite Gamsakhurdia’s extreme nationalism, it was under him, in the summer of 1991, that a compromise version of the law on elections to the Supreme Council of Abkhazia was developed and adopted, which envisaged a principle of quota-based representation of ethnic groups.

The initial version of this law, proposed by the Abkhaz side and providing for a bicameral structure of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic,²⁰ was rejected by the Georgian side. However, after the overthrow of Gamsakhurdia — the result of a “palace coup” in Tbilisi between 22 December 1991 and 6 January 1992 — the new Georgian authorities had no interest in recognising the legitimacy of the decisions and decrees of the former president’s government. As a result, many of these were revised, and the law on elections to the Supreme Council of Abkhazia met the same fate.

It was declared “apartheid-like” and was systematically criticised as a document violating the principle of majority rule. (Subsequently, it became one of the pretexts for the introduction of the Georgian State Council’s troops into Abkhazia.)

The Abkhaz parliament, elected under this “segregationist” law, was declared illegitimate and was urged to dissolve itself. Such demands became constant both in Sukhum and in Tbilisi. They were accompanied by mass rallies, marches, demonstrations, and other forms of protest, which led to an intensification of the “war of laws”, paralysis of power, aggravation of contradictions, a socio-political crisis, a radical polarisation of positions, and ultimately, to the political collapse in Abkhazia.

The self-dissolution of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia was presented as “an important stabilising factor”, even after the start of the Abkhaz–Georgian war (Statement of the Democratic Abkhazia faction).²¹ The situation was further aggravated by the fact that the illegitimate State Council of Georgia declared the legally elected Parliament of Abkhazia illegitimate. In February 1992, the armed formations of the Georgian State Council, introduced into Abkhazia ostensibly to combat “Zviadists”, carried out looting, robbery, and murder.

During April–May 1992, the troops of the Georgian State Council, after plundering Mingrelia, approached the borders of Abkhazia, which led to a sharp escalation of tension in and around the republic (Statement of the Presidium of the Caucasian Club of the Turkish Republic; Statement of the Presidential Council of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus).²²

Two months before the outbreak of the war, by decree of Eduard Shevardnadze, a border zone of Georgia was established on the territory of Abkhazia with a radius of 21 kilometres. It was announced that the population living in this area would have to “work for the benefit of the army guarding this zone.”²³ Given Abkhazia’s geographical position, this decree placed almost the entire populated area of the republic within a militarised zone — effectively turning Abkhazia into a reservation.

In his speech of 31 July 1992 on the occasion of Georgia’s admission to the United Nations, Georgian Foreign Minister A. Chikvaidze declared:

“There is not a single inch of non-Georgian land in Georgia, and we shall resolutely suppress any claim to Georgian land.”²⁴

As is well known, in response to an appeal from the deputies of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia proposing negotiations — dated 12 August 1992, in which they also expressed the hope that *“the hand we extend for a handshake will not hang in the air”*²⁵ — the Georgian State Council sent its troops into Abkhazia.

Under the circumstances, this meant war — a war which, according to B. Coppieters,

“should be regarded as the result of the inability to secure recognition of previous agreements and institutions.”²⁶

On 15 August, the second day of the war, Eduard Shevardnadze, speaking at a meeting of the State Council, declared:

“Like our great ancestors, in the struggle to preserve the territorial integrity of our state, we shall stop at nothing. For this cause we are ready to perish ourselves, but we shall also destroy anyone who tries to dismember our country.”²⁷

Actions and declarations such as these can scarcely be described as “initiatives for the peaceful settlement of the conflict and calls for dialogue.”

The Russian Factor and the Propaganda of Victimhood

Traditionally, “the instigators of conflicts on Georgian territory were considered to be solely the Kremlin.”²⁸ Despite the invalidity of explanations attributing the origins of post-Soviet conflicts to a “conspiracy of pro-imperial forces and the agony of a disintegrating monster-state,”²⁹ such notions in Georgia have not been eradicated — on the contrary, they have gained new life.

“Whenever the Abkhazians advanced demands unacceptable to Georgia, they were regarded as puppets acting under the pressure of Russia.”³⁰

The persistence of this prejudice stems, in my view, from the inability of Georgian political consciousness to perceive the Abkhaz national movement independently of “the hand of Moscow.” T. Gordadze likewise speaks of the need for Georgia to recognise the existence of “the Abkhaz question” as something distinct from the Russian factor.³¹ However, it seems unlikely that understanding will come soon — for that would require admitting the bankruptcy of theories that interpret “the Abkhaz problem” exclusively through the prism of a “third force.”

A telling manifestation of this mode of thought in contemporary Georgia can be seen in statements such as:

“The Abkhazians in Abkhazia decide nothing,” and “there is no Abkhaz side — only a Russian side.”³³

It is in this same vein that Zhorzholiani declares:

“Abkhazia, as is now clear to everyone — including the ultra-nationalist extremists — has once again become a bargaining chip in Russia’s political struggle for Georgia.”³⁴

In this case, the author acts as one of the propagators of the stereotype that exaggerates the role of the Russian factor in the Abkhaz–Georgian confrontation.

It should be noted that the seeds of such propaganda, falling on fertile soil, led to a situation where

“the belief that the war was, in fact, with Russia was shared by the overwhelming majority of Georgians.”³⁵

In all likelihood, two aims were thereby achieved: first, to present Georgia before the world as the object of aggression by Russia, and — given the prevailing global political conjuncture — to elicit additional sympathy for Georgia that might manifest itself in political, economic, and military support from the West; and second, to foster the notion that Georgia was fighting not 100,000 Abkhazians, who moreover “were unarmed”, but rather a great power aspiring to a key role on the global political stage — an idea that flattered the national ego and boosted Georgian self-esteem.³⁶

The historically established political, economic, cultural, and linguistic ties, as well as the presence of Russian troops in the region, certainly make the Russian factor in Abkhaz–Georgian contradictions significant. However, the existence of the Russian — as of any external — factor was determined, first, by the irreconcilability of the opposing sides, and second, by the “indeterminacy of Georgia’s foreign-policy doctrine.”³⁷

The influential actors of the international community, possessing levers to affect such conflicts, generally act unceremoniously — pursuing their policies without regard for the fate of the countries and peoples affected by their behaviour. The predominance of one external factor over another is dictated by geopolitical interests and the capacity of various actors within the hyper-globalised multipolar world system to realise them. These actors are represented in the region by military-political alliances, major powers, regional blocs, and the largest oil and financial corporations.

“Before the invasion of 14 August, Abkhazia had sought to conclude with Georgia a federative treaty. The principal outcome of the war unleashed by the Georgian State Council against Abkhazia was the emergence of two independent state entities.”³⁸

In Abkhazia, two independent actors fought — at least since Georgia’s aggression — and, in the absence of a peace treaty, they remain de facto at war nearly eight years after the cessation of large-scale hostilities. This, however, gives neither side any grounds to speak seriously of a state of war with Russia.

On 14 August it was the troops of the Georgian State Council that invaded Abkhaz territory. There, the “fighters” of Georgian paramilitary formations plundered, raped, and killed.

Russian General E. Baltin testified to the condition of the Georgian army at that time:

“The troops consisted of criminals who had been released from prisons, put on tanks, and given weapons.”³⁹

One of the leaders of a paramilitary group that formed part of Georgia’s governmental forces revealed:

“The Mkhedrioni received no pay for four years. They were supported financially, and the lads managed to make money somehow — by borrowing... and not repaying.”⁴⁰

Colonel S. Margishvili, a participant in the Abkhaz war, described the Georgian army as

“an artificial conglomerate of different military formations.”⁴¹

O. Vasilyeva likewise observed:

“The guardsmen of Kitovani and the Mkhedrioni are engaged in racketeering: some control petrol stations, others the sale of wool.”⁴²

G. Nodia called the Georgian army of the war years

“a collection of self-governing (that is, ungovernable) battalions with poetic names and weak coordination, in which patriots fought alongside bandits.”⁴³

It was difficult to expect from bandits and convicts that, along with weapons, they could also be armed with a readiness to die for the “territorial integrity” of Georgia. They had other ideas in their arsenal — ideas which they were quick to implement once in Abkhazia. The prevailing mood in Georgian society gave these “armed men” carte blanche to commit any actions without fear of punishment, so long as these actions were directed against the Abkhazians.⁴⁴ And the “armed men” took full advantage of that opportunity, fearing no one.

An eyewitness testified:

“We did not come here to serve — we came to ‘work’. We take orders from no one — neither Shevardnadze nor Kitovani. If anyone dares to forbid us to loot, we’ll turn around and leave immediately.”⁴⁵

This was, in all likelihood, the unspoken attitude of most of the “fighters” of the Georgian State Council guarding the “railway” in Abkhazia — something even the high command had to take into account, as illustrated by T. Kitovani’s statement that his soldiers “must first have their fill.”⁴⁶ Given the total absence of even basic discipline, the senior military leadership was powerless to resist, for

“if anyone were singled out for punishment, he would take offence and might well leave Abkhazia altogether with his men.”⁴⁷

Moreover, the generals themselves often confirmed by their behaviour that the motive of looting and easy gain took precedence over the “territorial integrity” of Georgia in the mindset of the military party in Tbilisi. An unnamed employee of the Georgian security service who participated in the war in Abkhazia revealed:

“People went door to door, invoking the name of General Geno Adamia, begging those not directly involved in combat to enlist in the ‘reserve’ battalion. Such false rosters gave our generals the chance to snatch up lucrative rewards.”⁴⁸

Interestingly, the same speculative practice, involving roughly the same contingent but in a different guise and in another geographical setting, continues to this day:

“In 1999–2000, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia uncovered more than 5,000 fictitious persons listed as refugees from Abkhazia.”⁴⁹

Evidently, this category of people could find a way to profit even on a desert island — by speculating on “the territorial integrity of Georgia.”

G. Lominadze, former Georgian Minister of Internal Affairs of Abkhazia and “in fact the one who created the seat of war in Sukhum,”⁵⁰ apparently taken aback by the “brave” behaviour of the “defenders” of Georgia’s “territorial integrity”, was forced to admit:

“I had heard and could imagine what war was, but the guardsmen descended upon the city like locusts.”⁵¹

Touching on this evidently sensitive subject, Zhorzholiani writes:

“We in no way intend to deny the crimes committed, but we would remind readers that, first, the term ‘government forces’ was quite a conditional one for a fledgling state with amorphous power structures. Unfortunately, the commanders of these so-called government forces often disobeyed even the Head of State.”⁵²

Leaving aside the question of why a state with “amorphous structures of power” embarked on a war instead of putting its house in order, it must be said that such justifications bring no relief to anyone. They will not resurrect the innocently slain, nor restore health to those who lost it, nor aid the overcoming of the “lost generation” syndrome, nor help to heal the profound alienation largely caused by the actions of Georgia’s “so-called government forces.” In the occupied part of Abkhazia, total genocide against the Abkhazians was carried out — not by anyone else, but precisely by representatives of the State Council and subsequently by the legitimised power structures of Georgia.⁵³

“The destruction of the Abkhaz State Archive in Sukhum by Georgian troops was aimed at annihilating the national memory of the Abkhaz people.”⁵⁴

It was already clear that to “guard the railway” did not require erasing a people’s historical memory. Such actions were designed to achieve far more significant goals — namely:

1. The liquidation of Abkhaz statehood in order to turn Abkhazia into one of the provinces of a unitary Georgia;

2. The extermination, suppression, and displacement of the Abkhazians as the indigenous population, and the reduction of Abkhazia’s status to that of a mere cultural autonomy confined to a few districts and villages;

3. The extermination, suppression, and expulsion of the Russian, Armenian, Greek, Jewish, and other populations of the republic to ensure the “mono-ethnicity” of Georgia in the region;

4. The plundering of the population and the economic infrastructure in order to destroy Abkhazia’s economy and seize the resources essential for its survival and development as an autonomous entity;

5. The destruction of the economic, political, cultural, linguistic, kinship, and psychological ties that had long connected Abkhazia with the North Caucasus, Russia, and Europe — all aimed at the total Georgianisation of the past and present of this territory.⁵⁵

In one of his speeches, the head of Georgia warned that, after their capture of Gudauta, only those Abkhazians who supported his policies would be allowed to live in Abkhazia. Later, Shevardnadze repeatedly reminded audiences of

“the need to bring this war, imposed upon us, to a worthy conclusion.”⁵⁶

I. Khaindrava likewise sorted Abkhazia’s population according to loyalty, stating:

“Those who did not follow Ardzinba’s adventurist course will live side by side with us in the future.”⁵⁷

The “Procurator” of Abkhazia, T. Nadareishvili, promised Georgian radio that he would

“bring misfortune to these separatists,”

adding:

“‘Misfortune’ is a good word compared to what they actually deserve from me in the near future.”⁵⁸

Georgia’s “Minister for Abkhazian Affairs”, G. Khaindrava, declared bluntly:

“We can easily and completely destroy the genetic stock of their nation by killing 15,000 — all the young men. And we are fully capable of doing so.”⁵⁹

Finally, the statement by the commander of the Georgian State Council’s forces in Abkhazia, G. Karkarashvili, about his readiness to sacrifice the lives of

“100,000 Georgians to annihilate all 97,000 Abkhazians,”⁶⁰

reveals the true objectives of Georgia’s invasion of Abkhazia.

In an interview published twelve days after the end of large-scale hostilities, on 12 October 1993, in Komsomolskaya Pravda, Shevardnadze admitted:

“Yes, we have lost Abkhazia, but I want to believe that this is a temporary phenomenon.”⁷⁰

It was precisely this policy of treating the loss of Abkhazia as “temporary” that led, in May 1998, to the local war in Abkhazia’s Gal District. The situation was aggravated by the continued existence and operation in Georgia of the so-called “Government of Abkhazia in Exile.”

Zhorzholiani concludes his work with “the wise words from the songs of our ancestors”:

“What is destroyed by enmity is reborn through love.”⁷¹

The song may indeed be beautiful, but as it has been “empirically proven that conflicts and competition (let alone wars) between groups intensify phobias and prejudices,”⁷² no one has the right to disregard “the lawful feelings of fathers who bury their sons during war.”⁷³

There is not a single Abkhaz who did not lose relatives in this war. This, combined with constant accusations against the Abkhazians of adhering to a “stereotype of vassal thinking,”⁷⁴ of “separatism,” “extremism,” and so forth — together with the endless talk of Georgia’s “territorial integrity” and Abkhazia’s “autonomy” — can only hinder the overcoming of total mutual mistrust and complete mutual incomprehension.⁷⁵

Through the efforts of Western foundations, meetings, debates, and roundtables with the participation of Abkhazians and Georgians are held, and books are published on possible ways out of the crisis. In recent years, voices have emerged in Georgia calling for an acknowledgment of responsibility for the war and for recognition of the Abkhazians’ right to build a state independent of Georgia. Yet these appeals serve merely to create a false impression of the existence in Georgia of differing, even opposing, approaches to resolving the Abkhaz–Georgian dispute. As their authors themselves admit, they are aimed at

“increasing the likelihood that, from among various options, a model for Abkhazia’s existence within Georgia will be chosen.”⁷⁶

There is also great reliance on the global political conjuncture, which, as noted,

“is such that the international community still wishes to see Georgia as a democratic country within the borders it inherited from the USSR.”⁷⁷

However, the current geopolitical configuration, while ignoring Abkhazia as a de jure subject of international law, may in fact signify its recognition as such de facto. Despite claims that attitudes among people in both Georgia and Abkhazia are changing, it is premature to speak of overcoming “the inertia of confrontational thinking.”

“It is doubtful whether either Georgians or Abkhazians can be convinced that they have not lost what they fought for.”⁷⁸

Periodically, at Georgia’s initiative, the resolutions of the UN Security Council and the European Parliament accuse Abkhazia of “non-constructiveness” and an “unwillingness to resolve the conflict by peaceful means.”

Moreover, Georgia itself has evidently not renounced the use of force — whether through its modernised army, the conferral of police powers upon the CIS Peacekeeping Forces, or even NATO’s intervention “to enforce peace.” Far from ceasing, acts of sabotage, hostage-taking, and murder in Abkhazia’s Gal District — committed by Georgian paramilitary groups operating with the blessing of official structures in Georgia — have become systematic.

It is constantly repeated in Georgia that the authorities allegedly do not control these “bandit formations” based on their territory. Yet the authors of such statements — aside from diminishing their own credibility — should ask themselves:

How, then, could the Georgian government have signed the Gagra Agreement on the cessation of hostilities during the “Gal War” of May 1998? How could it negotiate the release of hostages seized by military formations it does not control?

Why have no measures been taken against their leaders and members — often holders of documents issued by Georgia’s own security agencies? Such questions were also raised in April 2001 by representatives of Georgian civil society, who, amid renewed escalation in the Gal District, asked their country’s leadership:

“Is it pursuing a policy of peace or waging an undeclared war? What functions are performed by the armed groups operating in the Gal District? What is their status, and how do their actions correspond to the officially declared policy of peace?”⁷⁹

The tension — already high — was further inflamed by reports in the Russian press of a joint Georgian–NATO plan to occupy Abkhazia, as well as by large-scale military exercises held in Georgia under the NATO programme “Partnership for Peace”, involving the armed forces of eleven countries in the immediate vicinity of Abkhazia’s borders — an open demonstration of force and a celebration of revanchist moods in Georgia. Under such circumstances, Zhorzholiani’s reminders of “love” are laudable but untimely — not to mention his suggested “recipes” for the “revival” of “destroyed” feelings between Georgians and Abkhazians.

As for his work as a whole, it is nothing more than a political commission designed to defend and propagate the opportunistic interests of Georgia’s ruling political establishment, and therefore cannot be regarded as a contribution to the scholarly study of the problems it purports to address.

References

1. Fromm, E. “Chelovek: kto eto takoi (ili Kto est’ Chelovek)?” // Filosofiya i zhizn’, No. 12, 1991, p. 3. (Erich Fromm, “Man: Who Is He (or Who Is Man)?” // Philosophy and Life.)

2. Razyskaniya po istorii Abkhazii/Gruziya. Tbilisi, 1999. (Investigations into the History of Abkhazia/Georgia.)

3. Gamkrelidze, T. “Razyskaniya po istorii Abkhazii/Gruziya”. Svobodnaya Gruziya, No. 287–288, 1999, p. 4. (T. Gamkrelidze, “Investigations into the History of Abkhazia/Georgia”. Free Georgia.)

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6. Zhorzholiani, G. Op. cit., 1999, p. 414. (G. Zhorzholiani, cited work.)

7. Tsit. po (cited in) V. Chirikba, “Gruzino-abkhazskii konflikt: predlozheniya k konstitutsionnoi modeli”. In: Praktika federalizma. Alternativy dlya Gruzii i Abkhazii. Moscow, 1999, p. 407. (V. Chirikba, “The Georgian–Abkhaz Conflict: Proposals for a Constitutional Model”. In: The Practice of Federalism: Alternatives for Georgia and Abkhazia.)

8. Zhorzholiani, G. Op. cit., 1999, p. 429. (G. Zhorzholiani, cited work.)

9. Tsit. po (cited in) Yu. Voronov, P. Florenskii, T. Shutova. 1992–1993. Belaya kniga Abkhazii. Moscow, p. 76. (Yu. Voronov, P. Florensky, T. Shutova, 1992–1993. The White Book of Abkhazia.)

10. Molodoi kommunist, No. 63, 6 May, Tbilisi, 1989. (Young Communist.)

11. Mshevladze, R. “Akhalgazrda Komunisti”. 29 June, Tbilisi, 1989. (R. Mshevladze, Akhalgazrda Komunisti [Young Communist] — Georgian title as printed.)

12. Kritika, No. 4, Tbilisi, 1989, p. 54. (Critique.)

13. Pravoslavnaya Abkhazia, No. 4, Moscow, 1991, p. 1. (Orthodox Abkhazia.)

14. Demokraticheskaya Abkhazia, No. 5, Sukhum, 1992, p. 3. (Democratic Abkhazia.)

15. Tsit. po Beloi knige Abkhazii. 1992–1993. Moscow, p. 109. (Cited in The White Book of Abkhazia, 1992–1993.)

16. Ibid., p. 85. (Same source.)

17. Shevardnadze, E. Svobodnaya Gruziya, 2001, No. 1, p. 5. (E. Shevardnadze, Free Georgia.)

18. Zakareshvili, P. “Politicheskaya otvetstvennost’ i perspektivy gruzino-abkhazskogo uregulirovaniya”. In: Abkhazia – Gruziya. Prepyatstviya na puti k miru. Sukhum, 2000, p. 28. (P. Zakareshvili, “Political Responsibility and Prospects for a Georgian–Abkhaz Settlement”. In: Abkhazia – Georgia: Obstacles on the Path to Peace.)

19. Berdzenishvili, D. “Regional’nye partii v Gruzii”. Kavkazskii aktsent, No. 4, 2001, p. 4. (D. Berdzenishvili, “Regional Parties in Georgia”. Caucasian Accent.)

20. Ketsba, V. “Kakim dolzhen byt’ parlament”. Abkhaziya, 1991, No. 11–12, p. 7. (V. Ketsba, “What Should the Parliament Be Like”. Abkhazia.)

21. Demokraticheskaya Abkhazia, No. 5, 1992, p. 1. (Democratic Abkhazia.)

22. Respublika Abkhaziya, No. 87, 1992, p. 1. (Republic of Abkhazia.)

23. Yu. Voronov, “Chas Pik”. In: Genotsid abkhazov. Moscow, 1997, p. 200. (Yu. Voronov, “Rush Hour”. In: The Genocide of the Abkhazians.)

24. Tsit. po N. Akaba, “Opyt Shveitsarii i perspektivy abkhazo-gruzinskogo mirnogo uregulirovaniya”. In: Praktika federalizma. Alternativy dlya Abkhazii i Gruzii. Moscow, 1999, p. 97. (N. Akaba, “The Swiss Experience and Prospects for a Peaceful Abkhaz–Georgian Settlement”.)

25. “Obrashchenie Verkhovnogo Soveta Respubliki Abkhazii k Gossovetu Respubliki Gruziya”. In: Belaya kniga Abkhazii 1992–1993. Moscow, 1993, pp. 86–88. (“Appeal of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia to the State Council of the Republic of Georgia”. In: White Book of Abkhazia, 1992–1993.)

26. Koppiters, B. “Korni konflikta”. Assogd, 1999, Issue 7, p. 23. (B. Coppieters, “Roots of the Conflict”. Assogd [periodical as printed].)

27. Tsit. po V. Shariya, Abkhazskaya tragediya. Sochi, 1994, p. 38. (Cited in V. Shariya, The Abkhaz Tragedy.)

28. Berdzenishvili, D. Op. cit., p. 4. (Cited article.)

29. Tishkov, V. A. “Natsional’nost’ i natsionalizm v postsovetskom prostranstve (istoricheskii aspekt)”. In: Etnichnost’ i vlast’ v polietnichnykh gosudarstvakh. Moscow, 1994, p. 11. (V. A. Tishkov, “Nationality and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Space (Historical Aspect)”. In: Ethnicity and Power in Multi-Ethnic States.)

30. Nodia, G. “Konflikt v Abkhazii. Natsional’nye proekty i politicheskie obstoyatel’stva”. In: Gruzīny i abkhazy. Put’ k primireniyu. Moscow, 1998, p. 39. (G. Nodia, “The Conflict in Abkhazia: National Projects and Political Circumstances”. In: Georgians and Abkhazians: The Path to Reconciliation.)

31. Gordadze, T. “Moral’no-ideologicheskie prepyatstviya k uregulirovaniyu gruzino-abkhazskogo konflikta”. In: Abkhaziya – Gruziya. Prepyatstviya na puti k miru. Sukhum, 2000, p. 37. (T. Gordadze, “Moral and Ideological Obstacles to a Georgian–Abkhaz Settlement”.)

32. Nadareishvili, T. Aspekty gruzino-abkhazskogo konflikta. 3. Irvine, 2000, p. 20. (T. Nadareishvili, Aspects of the Georgian–Abkhaz Conflict, Vol. 3.)

33. Tsereteli, I. Ibid., p. 28. (I. Tsereteli, same source.)

34. Zhorzholiani, G. Op. cit., p. 409. (Cited work.)

35. Nodia, G. Op. cit., p. 50. (Cited article.)

36. Ioseliani, D. “Moment istiny”. // Abkhazskoe televidenie, 19 May 2001, 21:30. (D. Ioseliani, “Moment of Truth”. // Abkhaz Television [broadcast].)

37. Sigua, T. Svobodnaya Gruziya, No. 23, 1992, p. 4. (T. Sigua, Free Georgia.)

38. Voronov, Yu. “Memorandum v svyazi s sobytiyami v Abkhazii”. In: Bol’ moya Abkhaziya. Gagra, 1995, p. 54. (Yu. Voronov, “Memorandum in Connection with Events in Abkhazia”. In: My Pain, Abkhazia.)

39. Baltin, E. “Moment istiny”. // Abkhazskoe televidenie, 19 May 2001, 21:30. (E. Baltin, “Moment of Truth”. // Abkhaz Television [broadcast].)

40. Ioseliani, D. Demokraticheskaya Abkhazia, No. 53, 1993, p. 3. (D. Ioseliani, Democratic Abkhazia.)

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43. Nodia, G. Op. cit., p. 50. (Cited article.)

44. Margishvili, S. Op. cit., pp. 2–3. (Cited article — as printed in source list.)

45. Tsit. po V. Shariya, Abkhazskaya tragediya. Sochi, 1994, p. 85. (Cited in V. Shariya, The Abkhaz Tragedy.)

46. Ibid., p. 41. (Same source.)

47. Margishvili, S. Op. cit., pp. 2–3. (Cited article.)

48. Kavkazskii aktsent, 2000, No. 16. (Caucasian Accent.)

49. Nachkebiya, M. Svobodnaya Gruziya, 2001, No. 12, p. 11. (M. Nachkebiya, Free Georgia.)

50. Kavkazskii aktsent, 2000, No. 16. (Caucasian Accent.)

51. Tsit. po V. Shariya, Abkhazskaya tragediya. Sochi, 1994, p. 41. (Cited in V. Shariya, The Abkhaz Tragedy.)

52. Zhorzholiani, G. Op. cit., p. 435. (Cited work.)

53. Shariya, V. Abkhazskaya tragediya. Sochi, 1994; Tariya, A. 413 sutok okkupatsii. Sukhum, 1999, etc. (V. Shariya, The Abkhaz Tragedy; A. Tariya, 413 Days of Occupation.)

54. Coppieters, B. “Vvedenie”. In: Gruzīny i abkhazy. Put’ k primireniyu. Moscow, 1998, p. 6. (B. Coppieters, “Introduction”. In: Georgians and Abkhazians: The Path to Reconciliation.)

55. Voronov, Yu. “Memorandum v svyazi s sobytiyami v Abkhazii”. In: Bol’ moya Abkhaziya. Gagra, 1995, p. 55. (Yu. Voronov, “Memorandum in Connection with Events in Abkhazia”.)

56. Shevardnadze, E. Demokraticheskaya Abkhazia, No. 35, 1993, p. 1. (E. Shevardnadze, Democratic Abkhazia.)

57. Khaindrava, I. Demokraticheskaya Abkhazia, No. 12, 1992, p. 1. (I. Khaindrava, Democratic Abkhazia.)

58. Tsit. po Belaya kniga Abkhazii. 1992–1993. Moscow, 1993, p. 79. (Cited in White Book of Abkhazia, 1992–1993.)

59. Tsit. po V. Chirikba, “Gruzino-abkhazskii konflikt: v poiskakh putei vykhoda”. In: Gruziny i abkhazy. Put’ k primireniyu. Moscow, 1998, p. 9. (V. Chirikba, “The Georgian–Abkhaz Conflict: In Search of Ways Out”.)

60. Tsit. po G. Amkuab, T. Illarionova, Abkhaziya: khronika neobyavlennoi voiny. Chast’ I. 1992, pp. 127–128. (G. Amkuab, T. Illarionova, Abkhazia: Chronicle of an Undeclared War, Part I.)

61. Tsit. po G. Sikharulidze, “Udstsya li sokhranit’ neitralitet”. Kavkazskii aktsent, 2001, No. 3, p. 2. (G. Sikharulidze, “Will It Be Possible to Maintain Neutrality”. Caucasian Accent.)

62. Zhorzholiani, G. Op. cit., p. 435. (Cited work.)

63. Kavkazskii aktsent, 2000, No. 16. (Caucasian Accent.)

64. Ibid. (Same source.)

65. Tsit. po V. Shariya, op. cit., p. 40. (Cited in V. Shariya, cited work.)

66. Vasil’eva, O. Op. cit., p. 12. (Cited work.)

67. Zhorzholiani, G. Op. cit., p. 434. (Cited work.)

68. Ibid., p. 430. (Same work.)

69. Ibid., p. 438. (Same work.)

70. Tsit. po A. Argun, Abkhaziya: ad v rayu. Sukhum, 1994, p. 432. (A. Argun, Abkhazia: Hell in Paradise.)

71. Zhorzholiani, G. Op. cit., p. 439. (Cited work.)

72. Mamedov, M. “Litso Kavkazskoi natsional’nosti. K voprosu o massovykh predrassudkakh i menyayushchikhsya stereotipakh”. Tsentral’naya Aziya i Kavkaz, 3(4), 1999, p. 108. (M. Mamedov, “Face of Caucasian Nationality: On Mass Prejudices and Changing Stereotypes”. Central Asia and the Caucasus.)

73. Gerodot. “Pereklikka vekov. Razmyshleniya. Suzhdeniya. Vyskazyvaniya”. Comp. V. G. Noskov. Moscow, 1990, p. 106. (Herodotus. “Dialogue of the Ages: Reflections, Judgements, Utterances”.)

74. Khubua, G. Aspekty gruzino-abkhazskogo konflikta. 4. Irvine, 2000, p. 125. (G. Khubua, Aspects of the Georgian–Abkhaz Conflict, Vol. 4.)

75. Khidasheli, T. “Regulirovaniya konflikta putem gosudarstvenno-territorial’nogo ustroistva”. In: Aspekty gruzino-abkhazskogo konflikta. 4. Irvine, 2000, pp. 133–134. (T. Khidasheli, “Conflict Regulation through State–Territorial Arrangement”. In: Aspects of the Georgian–Abkhaz Conflict, Vol. 4.)

76. Berdzenishvili, D. Aspekty gruzino-abkhazskogo konflikta. 3. Irvine, 2000, pp. 17–18. (D. Berdzenishvili, Aspects of the Georgian–Abkhaz Conflict, Vol. 3.)

77. Ibid., p. 27. (Same source.)

78. Koen, D. “Vvedenie”. // Assogd, Issue 7, 1999, p. 12. (D. Cohen, “Introduction”. // Assogd [periodical as printed].)

79. Kavkazskii aktsent, No. 9, 2001, p. 1. (Caucasian Accent.)