Caucasus in Crisis: Dispatches from the Georgian-Abkhaz War
United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service | FBIS Reports | 1993 & 1994
Civic Diplomacy Mission Visits Area of Conflict
934K0358A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 19 Feb 93 p 1
[Article by Aleksandr Rybakov: “In Search of Consent”]
[Text] The mission, which included Abkhazians, Georgians, and Russians, visited Sochi, Adler, Gagra, Pitsunda, Gudauta, Sukhumi, and Tbilisi; talked with residents and refugees, and met with public figures from opposing sides.
“A meeting with government leaders and deputies of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia was held in Gudauta,” Nikolay Diko, coordinator of the International Committee on Civic Diplomacy, said. “Everyone was unanimous about the fact that, despite all its complexity, the conflict can be resolved politically with the observance of the interests of both parties.”
Musa Shanibov, president of the Confederation of the Caucasian People, talked about its readiness to participate in a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The president declared that, if its peace-making efforts were successful, the confederation would appeal to the Caucasian people to do everything to prevent a blood feud.
In Sukhumi members of the mission exchanged views about ways to settle the conflict peacefully with Tamaz Nadreyshvili, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic, and Lorik Marshaniy[a], his deputy,” added Soliko Khabeishvili, coordinator of the International Committee on Civic Diplomacy. “We did not try to ‘expose’ anyone, or to look for those who were right or those who were wrong, and we found understanding.”
Russian troops do not participate in combat operations, but their weapons and equipment have spread throughout the region
— Eduard Shevardnadze
In Tbilisi Georgia’s leader Eduard Shevardnadze noted that, despite the extremely complex situation, there was still a possibility for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.
And so, everyone wants peace and… everyone is fighting. Russian troops do not participate in combat operations, but their weapons and equipment have spread throughout the region and have fallen into the hands of those who are fighting. Everyone suffers. The deputy head of the government in Sukhumi complains that one of his nephews is on this side and another on that. He is afraid from where a terrible report will come first. After all, the snipers are shooting.
To the question by the correspondent of ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI about the specific proposals put forward by the mission to stop the fratricidal war S. Khabeishvili answered:
“We must study the conflict mechanism and find acceptable peace-keeping forces. There are a lot of people with arms in the Caucasus. A third force is needed. The Georgians are for the introduction of U.N. peace-keeping forces and the Abkhazians agree to the introduction of the forces of Russia and of CIS countries. Russia must clearly define its position.”
In N. Diko’s opinion, interference in the events by certain political forces in Russia not supported by the Government of the Russian Federation is one of the significant reasons for the aggravation of the situation in the Caucasus. “People’s diplomats intend to meet with R. Khasbulatov, and to inform him of their vision for the settlement of this conflict, taking the traditions of the Caucasian people into consideration. The path of people’s diplomacy may prove to be very fruitful.”
Meanwhile, not a single tangerine has been picked in Sukhumi and Ochamchirskiy Rayon. And now, trees will not bear fruit for 3 or 4 years. How many fruits will the withering tree of former consent and peace in this land of plenty not bear?
Abkhazian Parliamentarian Views Conflict
934F0144B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Feb 93 p.7
[Interview with Sokrat Dzhindzholiya, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Abkhazia, by Aleksey Bausin; ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondence date and place not given: “Georgia Also Needs Peace in Abkhazia”]
[Text] Adler-Moscow—The deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Abkhazia answers questions from a ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent.
[Bausin] How can you comment on the present stage in the confrontation between Abkhazia and Georgia?
[Dzhindzholiya] Today’s events derive from what happened on 14 August 1992 when State Council troops entered the territory of Abkhazia under the pretext of protecting the railroads and communications. Sukhumi’s city began, and the Supreme Soviet building, where I was located, were shelled during the very first minutes. A session, during which it was proposed to discuss the problem of our mutual relations with Georgia, should have been held there.
Yes, the USSR has disintegrated and all the republics have become independent, including Georgia. We are not opposed to this. The people are selecting that path of development which suits them. They decided in Tbilisi to return to the 1921 constitution. However, that constitution does not provide for the existence of the Republic of Abkhazia. However, we became part of Georgia as an autonomous republic and should regulate our relations.
In order to fill this legal vacuum, we suggested our own draft. What reaction did not follow.
The Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia was forced to appeal to the 1925 constitution in accordance with which the relations of the two republics were built on treaty principles. We wanted to return to this legal foundation in order to conduct negotiations, a civilised basis. However, instead of putting forth its own counterproposals, Georgia introduced troops. A war that was forced on us began. We did not want it; we are being forced to defend our territory.
The forces of the State Council occupied part of Abkhazia’s territory. An occupation regime was established here and violations of human rights reached such scales that the number of refugees reached in the hundreds of thousands.
We do not want a military solution to the conflict; we are prepared to sit down at the negotiating table. The talks, say, begin, we are proposing some kind of conditions. We are not placing any preliminary conditions. However, in order to create the conditions for the talks we must have all the forces of the State Council forces from Abkhazia’s territory. At the same time it is necessary to send home all the volunteers who came to our aid from the North Caucasus. The Abkhazian diaspora abroad is also helping us.
[Bausin] How are they helping you specifically?
[Dzhindzholiya] We already have more than 3,000 applications from Abkhazians in Turkey requesting that they be returned to their homeland. We state officially that we will not deny anyone this. Can the authorities in Russia deny him the return of a Russian person to his native land?
At one time, rumors were spread that some states were selling us tanks, all the equipment which we have today, we seized during the battle of Gagra. After a publication, we listed the quantity and body numbers, the acquisitions, we photographed all of these machines which are at our disposal, they were at one time transferred to the State Council by the Transcaucasus Military District with the consent of the government. This equipment should not have been used in interethnic conflicts. However, this is a matter of honor and conscience for the Georgian leadership. I am not accusing Russia of anything.
+ Tengiz Kitovani: “they [Russians] officially gave us the 108 tanks of the Akhaltsikhe Division”
+ Russian Officer Views Abkhaz Conflict (27 April 1993) | FBIS Report
+ The Hand of Moscow and the Sterility of Geneva, by Izida Chania
[Bausin] Do you think that the Georgian side will get around to implementing your demands?
[Dzhindzholiya] Shevardnadze—and they consider him a big politician—should understand that the longer this war continues, the less the chances for settling it. However, there is one factor. He thinks that the longer the conflict continues, the stronger Georgia will be, that he will get his people to rally around him, and then he can quietly withdraw his forces. This will be when he can then put an end to an ethnic one. This would be terrible. More than 200,000 Georgians live here. Shevardnadze wants to arm them and send them against us. However, we believe that reason will conquer. We do not want this. We are not trying to establish some kind of unacceptable rule. It is necessary to put an end to the war quickly; otherwise, the conflict will expand beyond the border of the Black Sea. You think that if Georgia gets the upper hand over us, they will not look at this calmly in the North Caucasus. We know that more than 15,000 North Caucasus people have already signed up as volunteers and are ready to come to our assistance. We have not told them to come. We want to end this war in order to maintain good relations with Russia, the North Caucasus, and Georgia. All of us must live together on this land and the conflict should not be resolved by power methods. The example of South Ossetia is extremely instructive in this respect.
[Bausin] What can Russia do to help extinguish the flames of this war?
[Dzhindzholiya] In order to contribute to its settlement, Russia should be more strict in demanding from all parties the fulfillment of the decisions which its legislative organs adopted on 3 September 1992. One must mention that Russia’s parliament adopted this right after this. A very good provision exists in it. One must begin to work already for a peaceful solution to the problem.
I think that Russia is a great state, the legal successor to the former USSR. Why is it not a matter of concern to it that conflicts are arising on the territory of the former USSR? Georgia is fighting for its territorial integrity by force of arms. I think that this is absurd. How can U.N. forces come here if we, Abkhazians, are in the Russian Federation’s sphere of interest? One must talk about peace-making forces; we agree to the introduction of Russian peace-making forces, first of all.
Russia is trying to solve the confrontation, but it could not do otherwise. The North Caucasus has found itself dragged into the war of Abkhazia. Naturally, it cannot sit and watch while a fire begins in its south. However, to Moscow’s honor, it has not introduced tanks where conflicts have arisen—in Tatarstan and Chechnya.
Russian Influence on Inexperienced Georgian Military Leadership
[944F0706A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jun 94 p 3]
[Article by Petr Karapetyan under “In the CIS Armies” rubric: “’The Russian General Will Come...’ They Said in Tbilisi. And He Has Come”]
[Text] Every spring there is a new Minister of Defense in Georgia.
Tengiz Kitovani became head of the military department in May 1992. The hero of the anti-Gamsakhurdia action and father of the National Guard immediately declared his intention to urgently set about building unified armed forces. But in the wake of the attacks on Russian military units (just take that one incident—there were casualties on both sides—with the tank regiment in Gori!), the hijacking of automobiles, the “privatization” of Russian servicemen’s apartments, and the political intrigues, the good intention has remained precisely that—a good intention.
What is also indicative is whom Tengiz Kitovani (an architect by education; his military experience consists of three years of draft service in the Belorussian Military District) intended to build an army with. Tengiz Kalistratovich had as his deputy, for example, a man who was a complete civilian, although he had been elevated to general by the former. This was Tamaz Dumbadze, a graduate of the Moscow Institute of Soviet Trade. And another general, also homegrown, with a diploma from a Georgian polytechnic institute, is Dzhemal Chumburidze, chief of the National Guard Main Directorate. He has been Deputy Defense Minister as of March 1993.
Incidentally, generals were appointed on the basis of completely farfetched talk to the effect that Georgians were not given promotions in the Soviet Army. And since that was the case, Tengiz Kalistratovich evidently decided, yesterday’s colonels, lieutenant colonels, and captains should be raised to the rank of general. Everyone was rewarded! But was this done on merit?
Georgiy Karkarashvili. In 1990 he was a captain in the Soviet Army, chief of staff of an artillery division; and since 14 September 1992 he has also been a general in the Georgian Armed Forces. Paata Datuashvili. In 1990 he was a lieutenant colonel and commander of a rocket artillery division in the Transbaykal Military District. He has become a major general and Georgian first deputy defense minister.
The list of “wild-growing” generals can be continued. But are we talking only about generals? The commander of a detachment of seven or eight men has already called himself colonel and commander of a battalion. Hence the joke was born: “In the Georgian Army the first military rank is that of major.”
Either there was no one to get involved in army organizational development or, despite the cunning nature of the propaganda of the time, no “Soviet generals,” even retired ones, could be found?
But there are some. Colonel General Anatoliy Kamkamidze, Lieutenant Generals Levan Sharashenidze, Mikhail Elbakidze, and Robert Tavadze, Major General Panteleymon Georgadze.... They had served in the Soviet Army for decades, but they nevertheless did not get the top roles in the Georgian Army. Admittedly, Levon Sharashenidze spent four months as minister of defense (January-May 1992), until his first serious conflict with the leadership of the National Guard. Pantaleymon Georgadze (the father of Igor Georgadze, the Republic’s current security minister) spent some time in command of Border Guard Troops, but he did not last long after disagreeing with parliament in his views concerning the organizational development of the Army. The other “red generals” became the deputies of yesterday’s captains.
On the other hand, the “armed men” in Georgia felt free under Tengiz Kalistratovich to earn their living sometimes by robbery and sometimes by terror.
Never mind robbery! The fall of 1992. There is war in Abkhazia and parliament is examining the composition of the new Cabinet of Ministers in Tbilisi. The deputies refuse to confirm Tengiz Sigua, Kitovani’s comrade-in-arms in the anti-Gamsakhurdia action, in the post of prime minister. By a curious coincidence, it was precisely when National Guard troops started wandering the corridors of parliament (only the slow-witted did not realize why this should suddenly happen) and a rumor spread around town that “Kitovani’s guys” want to come to visit for a couple of days from Abkhazia that the deputies voted as one for Sigua.
Kitovani got his deserts several months later, in May 1993. The parliamentary deputies suddenly “remembered” that Tengiz Kalistratovich had not been confirmed in the post of minister of defense (and, it turned out, this should have been done straight after the parliamentary elections in fall 1992), and they rebelled, saying that this was out of order. The issue was put to the vote and was rejected. But Kitovani’s game was already up by then. The Georgian detachments were suffering defeat after defeat in Abkhazia; it did not prove possible to tame the rebellious autonomous formation, as Kitovani had promised; disagreements with Eduard Shevardnadze intensified, and only one solution remained: To get out.
Which he did, having spoken to Georgiy Karkarashvili beforehand. What they talked about is unknown, but Karkarashvili often repeated afterward that if it had not been for the parting words of Kitovani, who “made him a man,” he would not have complied with Eduard Shevardnadze’s request that he become minister of defense. One way or another the new appointment took place—and, alas, in a form which ensured continuity of the style of leadership of the Armed Forces: Reforms were not carried out, and at the front things went worse then ever. There were ambitions and promises to launch a large-scale offensive against the Abkhazians (this brought a skeptical smile to the people who knew the state of the Georgian Armed Forces). In a word, Karkarashvili was like his teacher, and observers noted entirely fairly that the former captain was brave and knew how to fight, but was useless as a commander. In February 1994, in the wake of the Abkhazian nightmare, Georgiy Karkarashvili resigned. His relations with Eduard Shevardnadze appeared to have deteriorated seriously after Karkarashvili, during a Zviadist offensive in the west of the republic, repealed an order of the supreme commander in chief and refused to fight against Loti Lobaliya…
After Karkarashvili, the Georgian parliament prevaricated for almost four months over the appointment of a new minister. This time passed amid reflections about the future of the national army. Not just reflections, however. A resolution was adopted on the procedure for awarding military ranks. Given the complete anarchy of previous years in this respect, the step was a prudent one. The 300 Georgian officers who did not respond to the appeal to return from the Russian Army were discussed with bitterness. Furthermore, reports are coming into the Georgian Ministry of Defense’s personnel organs with a request...to assist in transfers to the Russian Army: People have gotten fed up with low pay, the lack of social protection, the lack of any service prospects. Parliamentary Speaker Vakhtang Goguadze spoke very emotionally and unexpectedly as follows: “Georgia will be free when a Russian general summons the leadership of the Georgian Army and announces to it: ‘Congratulations. Henceforth Georgia is free. I wish you all the best.’ And in response, Georgian servicemen will shout a grateful ‘Hurrah’ and swear an oath of loyalty to Russia. There is no other way out....”
The opposition claims: “The Russian general has already arrived.” By “the Russian” they mean Lieutenant General Varden Nadibaidze, whom parliament confirmed in the post of defense minister in May of this year. (He was born 31 March 1939 in the village of Mleta in Georgia’s Dushetskiy Rayon. He graduated from the Ordzhonikidze Military Automobile School and the Rear Services and Transportation Academy. He has served in the Kiev Military District, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and, since 1972, in the Transcaucasus, where he rose to deputy commander for armaments of the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus.)
So why “Russian”? Nadibaidze is no arriviste; he is from the real and true Georgian heartland. Admittedly, during his years of service he has forgotten the language somewhat, and only gives interviews to journalists in Russian. And the opposition holds this against him. Once again, a general who has served in Russia has been appointed to the post of minister—and the opposition has noted this “point” too.
Everything can be corrected: The language can be brought up to standard, and the transfer (and that will doubtless happen) to the national army will be officially registered. Something else is far more important: The military department is not headed by an architect or a pianist but by a functioning general who does not represent the interests of any political parties, clans, or groups (unlike his predecessors). This happens once in a blue moon....
As for Russia, then, no matter what it might say, its interest is the same as before: Having for a neighbor a united, stable state. And if the “Russian” General Nadibaidze facilitates this, then what is there in this that runs counter to Georgia’s national interests?
See also:
“Georgia for the Georgians”: The Evolution of a Nationalistic Slogan
The Republic of the Union of Mountain Peoples, Abkhazia, and Soviet Policies: A Historical Analysis
Mobilizing in Uncertainty: Collective Identities and War in Abkhazia
Georgian Brutality and Local Support | ‘Mobilizing in Uncertainty’, by Anastasia Shesterinina